Current distributed mobile systems are usually characterized by a huge number of nodes, different network domains, different applications running, variability of the users' behavior, and dynamicity and heterogeneity of the communication networks. A typical example can be found in the automotive context, considering car-to-car and car-to-infrastructure communication scenarios. In this paper we propose a model-based approach for the dependability evaluation of distributed applications in a mobile environment. The final Multiple Phased System model representing the analyzed mobile scenario is automatically derived from highlevel UML specifications through a sequence of model transformation steps. The evaluation workflow is based on i) a hierarchical modelling approach that analyzes the system at different levels, namely communication, architecture, application and user level; ii) a time-based system decomposition identifying different phases for different user activities and environment conditions.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional distributed systems consist of multiple nodes connected with wired computer networks. Today wireless networking technologies are also available and they facilitate Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. SERENE 2008, November [17] [18] [19] 2008 , Newcastle, UK. Copyright 2008 ACM 978-1-60558-275-7/08/11...$5.00 the communication among mobile actors such as vehicles on a highway. Several emerging applications may illustrate the benefits of wireless networking technologies in the automotive context (e.g., see [10] ): traffic coordination on a highway allows to bypass the area of accidents or traffic jam, platooning allows a convoy of cars to be driven by the first one (the ones behind it follow the convoy autonomously), the distributed black box application can help to identify the causes of accidents, the ambulance warning informs drivers about the approaching ambulance.
Wireless communication technology is flexible for these purposes but the inherent unreliability of links in mobile distributed systems raises the questions of application level unreliability. Since we are dealing with mobile devices, communication link reliability depends on the actual distances between the nodes (nodes may simply be out of each others range), as well as on the presence of obstacles like hills or buildings that may appear between communicating nodes along the route, which may cause temporary loss of connections. Besides unreliable communication links, the hardware and software faults in the application components shall be taken into account as well, especially in safety-critical applications like platooning or emergency warning.
The evaluation of the effects of low level faults of hardware/software components and unavailability of network resources is among the current challenges that influence the adoption of distributed mobile applications in dependability critical areas. In mobile environments, the traditional approach for dependability evaluation has to deal with specific problems like dynamicity, heterogeneity of the network domains, large number of components and scenarios, strong interdependences between the system components.
In this paper we introduce a model-based approach for the evaluation of high-level, end-to-end dependability properties in distributed mobile applications. Three basic models are first built, capturing, respectively, the software/hardware components (with their failure/repair behavior and dependencies) supporting the applications, the users behavior (interaction with the applications) and the users mobility as-pects (influencing the availability of communication links), in a given scenario. Then, an automatic evaluation workflow takes these models as input and transforms them step by step, constructing a composite system-level dependability model that can be solved by external solvers to compute user-level measures of a scenario (here the probability that a given user activity sequence can be successfully executed in a dynamically changing environment).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the basic principles underlying the modelling approach are introduced. Section 3 describes the evaluation workflow in detail, while Section 4 demonstrates its usage through an illustrative example. Conclusions are in Section 5.
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND RELATED WORKS
In this section we describe the basic principles adopted in the definition of our framework for dependability evaluation of distributed mobile applications.
Analytic state-space stochastic models are commonly used for dependability modeling of computing systems, since they are able to capture various functional and stochastic dependencies among components and allow evaluation of various measures related to dependability and performance (i.e., performability measures) based on the same model, when a reward structure is associated to them. The complexity of models depends on the dependability measures to be evaluated, the modeling level of detail, and the stochastic dependencies among the components. To master complexity, a modeling methodology is needed so that only the relevant system aspects need to be detailed, allowing numerical results to be effectively computable. An excellent survey on the approaches dealing with model complexity (i.e., largeness avoidance and tolerance techniques) can be found in [17] , while the available performability modeling tools and techniques are discussed in [8] and [19] .
In this paper we propose a modeling and evaluation framework that attacks system complexity combining: i) a hierarchical (static) abstraction-based modeling approach to represent system's aspects at different levels (namely user, application, architecture and communication level), and ii) a time-based system decomposition approach to (dynamically) identify different phases for different user activities and environment conditions. To facilitate the model construction process, the stochastic dependability models are automatically derived based on high-level system description (workflow models and UML), exploiting the hierarchical and time-based approaches to mitigate the overall system complexity.
The two approaches have been already used in isolation in the past literature, but here the novelty is that they are combined together to deal with the specific system characteristics (mainly network dynamicity and users mobility), and they are included in an automatic process of deriving a system-level dependability model. Model-based dependability evaluation by deriving dependability models from engineering models is not a new idea either (examples of this approach are related to UML [3] , AADL [18] and business process models [7] ), but here the original contribution is to explicitly include mobility and user aspects in the derivation process so as to properly address the challenging issues related to the dependability evaluation of distributed mobile environment scenarios.
In the rest of this section we specify the adopted abstraction-based and time-based approaches. The way they are exploited in the derivation process will be outlined in Section 3.
The abstraction-based modeling approach
The system is structured into different levels corresponding to different abstraction layers. In particular, we have identified the following levels:
• User level. This level describes the users' profiles, that is how the users interact with the applications available for them (e.g., voice call, emergency warning, video conferencing, etc.) and how their requests are mapped to the different components of the application and the supporting architecture. Mobility, available applications and application utilization are users' characteristics that can differentiate a user's class from another.
The dependability attributes at the user level depend on the dependability attributes of the components of the application and of the supporting architecture.
• Application level. This level describes the high level functionalities that are provided for the user. Moreover, it identifies for each function and application component the set of services (e.g., messaging, timing) offered by the architecture for its implementation. Each function and application component may depend on several services and the services may depend on each other.
• Communication/architecture level. This is the part of the system capturing the behavior of the main hardware and software components (resources) that can affect the application-level measures, distinguishing the communication-related services (e.g., those providing a wireless network connection). This level describes how the application components and services of the application level are implemented on these resources.
Here we focus on the assessment of the impact of component and communication failures and repairs on the dependability and, more generally, on the Quality of Service (QoS) perceived by the users. Conceptually, a submodel is associated to each abstraction level to evaluate dependability measures characterizing the quality of service delivered by the different entities of the corresponding level taking into account the dependability properties of the lower level submodels. The outputs of a given level are used in the next immediately upper level to compute the dependability measures associated to this level. Figure 1 depicts a possible dependency relation graph among the components (entities) belonging to the different abstraction levels. The dependability models at a given abstraction level capture the failure and repair processes and mechanisms of the components, and the relations "uses" define the dependency hierarchy. The submodel of the user is used for representing QoS observations.
If dependability parameters of a service are available or can be computed by a specific evaluation technique that considers the precise semantics of the service (e.g., using a specific simulation model or an experimental evaluation technique) then the internal structure of this service is not Figure 1 : Abstraction-based modeling approach refined (this way the dependability parameters are used at the highest level of the application hierarchy). If high-level dependability parameters cannot be computed then the architecture and its dependencies on the lower level hardware and communication resources are taken into account. The model refinement is terminated at the level of basic components (software modules or hardware components), assigning some local dependability parameters like the fault occurrence rate.
According to this concept, the considered fault model depends on the abstraction level. If the results of a specific evaluation method are utilized, then the considered fault model will implicitly integrate (and rely on) the specific fault model underlying that method. Otherwise an abstract fault model belonging to the software and hardware architecture will be used: to each hardware and software component a generic dependability analysis sub-model will be assigned that represents its fault activation process (healthy, erroneous and failure states of the component are distinguished, where failure means a deviation from the correct service of that component). Moreover, network connections may exhibit fault activation on their own. This modeling approach handles faults in an abstract way, thus considering that they all result in the provision of an incorrect service, but not differentiating between the different types of failures (crash, omission, timing, data corruption, etc.).
The time-based decomposition approach
The scenarios we are focusing on are very dynamic in their nature. As the time elapses, diverse applications can be running (e.g., voice call or video conferencing), diverse communication networks may be available (like GPRS, UMTS and WLAN), and the users' behavior can change as well, e.g., passing from normal to emergency behavior in case of car accident. In such a dynamic environment, we can see the system lifetime as a sequence of periods (phases), each one characterized by a fixed system configuration.
Due to these characteristics, such systems can be properly modelled as a Multiple Phased System (MPS) [16] . MPS is a class of systems characterized by an operational life that can be partitioned in time into a set of disjoint periods called phases. The existence of phases is a consequence of diverse tasks to be performed, diverse environmental conditions, and different dependability requirements in different periods of system lifetime.
Typically, the model of a MPS is seen as composed of two logically separate Petri nets: the System Net, representing the system (its components, their interactions and their failure/repair behavior) using the GSPN formalism [13] , and the Phase Net, representing the control part (i.e., describing the phase changes) using the Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Net formalism [5] . In the System Net, a single model is built for the whole scenario, representing all components that are used in at least one phase. The Phase Net allows easy modeling of a variety of scenarios by sequencing the phases in appropriate ways.
This approach has been generalized in [15] based on Markov Regenerative Stochastic Petri Nets. The key point is that the state space of the Markov regenerative process is never generated and handled as a whole, but rather the various subordinate intra-phase processes are separately generated and solved. As a consequence, the computational complexity of the analytical solution is reduced to the one needed for the separate solution of the different phases.
It is worth mentioning that the evaluation workflow presented in this paper is also applicable to systems that do not fit the MPS model (just considering them as MPS with one single phase only, encompassing the whole system's lifetime), at the price of an increase of the overall spatial/temporal complexity that may become unmanageable.
THE EVALUATION WORKFLOW
In this section we present the evaluation workflow. The scenario under analysis is considered as a MPS. Starting from a set of UML input models and a wireless network topology model representing the scenario, the workflow consists of a sequence of automatic model transformation steps that finally lead to the generation of the corresponding MPS analysis model. The goal is to compute the probability of successful execution of the series of user activities defined at the user level.
The evaluation workflow follows the approach presented in the previous section. Hierarchical decomposition is applied by considering communication, architecture, application and user levels, while the time-based decomposition approach is utilized to model the changes induced by the user activities and the varying environment conditions.
The overall scheme of the evaluation workflow is sketched in Figure 2 . In the figure, models are represented as parallelograms. Multi-layered parallelograms indicate that there are multiple models of the same kind used during the evaluation of the scenario, e.g., the user workflows of the participants. White rectangles stand for steps using modeling tools and transformations, while the light gray rectangle represents the evaluation step of the Multiple Phased System model. The large gray square captures the numerous model transformation steps that have been implemented in order to integrate the previously available modeling tools and transformers.
The set of models provided as input to the "model transformation steps" represents: the sequence of user activities ("user workflow model"), the structure of the applications invoked by the users and the dependability parameters of Figure 2 : General scheme of the evaluation workflow specific services or resources included in these applications ("application-service dependency model"), and the traffic and the mobility pattern ("topology model"). The first two models are UML specifications, while the last one is derived by a mobility trace generator.
The output of the model transformation steps is a MPS analysis model. This model is the input of an external solver (here DEEM [4] ) which carries out the transient evaluation resulting in the success probability of the user activity sequence.
The output of the evaluation, i.e., the probability of successful execution of the user activity sequence, can be useful to characterize the user activities in a best case or worst case situation (e.g., whether it is possible to execute the activities in case of extreme network conditions), to compare different execution strategies at the user level (e.g., whether it is reasonable to rely on given functions or it is better to use other ones), or to compare different environment options (e.g., compare routes with different traffic and infrastructure conditions and use the one that is characterized by a higher probability of successful execution for a given activity sequence).
Input Models of the Evaluation Workflow
To define a scenario we need to describe the user activities, the structure of the applications invoked by the users, the dependability parameters of specific services or resources included in these applications, the traffic and the mobility pattern. The mobile nodes are called as the participants of the scenario.
This section discusses the three input models that altogether define a scenario: the "user workflow model", the "topology model" and the "application-service dependency model".
The User Workflow Model
The user workflow model defines the sequence of user activities during the scenario (the mobility aspects like speed and direction are not addressed in the user workflow, they are included in the topology model). There is a user workflow for each participant of the scenario to be evaluated. This information is needed for the identification of the set of phase changes representing the variations of user activities in the dependability model. The user workflow, however, differs from the conventional workflow concepts in some aspects:
• The evaluation deals with the probabilistic evaluation of the fault and repair processes of the components, but does not involve the probabilistic modeling of human behavior, e.g., probability of alternative human decisions in given situations. In the most simple case the user workflow is linear, and no decisions are made, however, more complex user workflows (including parallel activities, deterministic decisions) are also allowed.
• The user workflow, besides describing the sequence of activities used in the given scenario, defines the execution times of these applications. Execution time can be specified as the length of a time period or by exact start and stop times.
The user workflow can be described using a subset of UML Activity diagrams. Figure 3 defines a scenario starting at 16:00 with a chat application. The user is having a three minutes long chat conversation with another participant located in another car. After three minutes an ambulance warning is issued and the scenario ends at 16:07.
The Topology Model
The dependability evaluation of a scenario needs information on the evolving ad-hoc wireless network topology among the participants. There is a topology model for each technology that can be used for communication. The computation of topologies is usually based on mobility traces. Among the numerous tools available to generate these traces, we have used VanetMobiSim [6] because it is easily extensible thanks to its plug-in based architecture.
The wireless network topology is computed based on the output of VanetMobiSim. In each discrete moment of the mobility trace, the set of available wireless connections (i.e., the current topology) is determined currently by a simple threshold detector based on the distances between the nodes. Here we are implicitly assuming that the evolution of the wireless network topology can be statically determined at the beginning of the evaluation workflow.
The identification of a different topology, with respect to the previous one, triggers a phase change. During the model transformation steps the topology model is handled as a series of topologies valid for specific time intervals.
The Application-Service Dependency Model
The application-service dependency model specifies how the applications (invoked by the user as described by the activities of the user workflow) depend on the underlying services (at the lowest level on the hardware and software components of the nodes), i.e., what is needed for the application in order to function properly. There is at least one application dependency model belonging to each application. If multiple applications are used simultaneously, then their interdependency has to be included in the dependency model, since they may have shared resources, so their dependability attributes may not be independent.
The advantages of the hierarchical decomposition described in Section 2.1 are utilized in this step. If the dependability parameters of a service can be derived by a specific evaluation method then the modeling of the internal details of this service is not necessary, and the service is considered as a single entity in the dependency model. If specific quality of service (QoS) parameters can be derived, these have to be mapped to dependability parameters by comparing the required and the offered quality of service (currently it is assumed to be a manual task in the construction phase of this input model).
If there is no directly applicable method to compute the dependability parameters of a service then its architecture, modeled using UML architecture diagrams, is the input of the evaluation workflow. The UML model details the entities that are needed for the correct operation of the service (i.e., hardware and software components identified at the architecture level of the multilevel modeling approach), and the dependability parameters of the service are computed on the basis of the local parameters of these components. The network level resources that are needed by the services are taken into account in the latter steps of the evaluation workflow.
In more detail, the architecture model used here is an extended UML object diagram. Objects represent the services, and the hardware and software components at the underlying architecture level. Links are used to represent the connections among them. The types of components, the redundancy schemes and the component level dependability attributes are modeled by using stereotypes and tagged values according to the conventions developed in [12] . In summary, these extensions represent generic fault occurrence processes, error propagations and repair mechanisms. The fault occurrence process describes how component faults occur and how these faults result in errors and failures. The main characteristics are the fault occurrence rate and the error latency (the time interval elapsed between fault occurrence and its manifestation in an erroneous state). Several component types can be distinguished based on their faulty behavior at this abstraction level (e.g., stateful or stateless hardware and software components). Error propagation processes describe how errors of a component propagate to other ones. Propagation through a simple interconnection is characterized by a propagation probability, while in the case of redundancy a non-trivial relation (e.g., a fault tree) is referenced. Here one component has to be appointed as the redundancy manager that provides the interface of the redundancy structure to the other components, and distinguished variants provide the redundant functionalities. Finally, repair/recovery mechanisms characterized by a delay describe the removal of faults and errors.
From the point of view of the phased behavior, two types of stateful software components have to be distinguished:
• Software components preserving the health status in inactive phases (in a similar way to stateful hardware components).
• Software components that do not preserve the health status over inactive phases. It means that in active phases the software is restarted in a healthy state. An example of such a software component is a user application like a chat program, whose initial state is static.
Wireless connections are modelled as separate resources with the following parameters: fault occurrence rate, error latency, and repair/recovery delay.
Internal Models and Model Transformation Steps
The evaluation workflow involves several internal model transformation steps (see the "model transformation steps" black box of Figure 2 ). The major steps are: i) derivation of the aggregated phase model (see Section 3.2.1), and ii) derivation of the MPS model (see Section 3.2.2).
The Aggregated Phase Model
The aggregated phase model carries all information about the scenario that is necessary to derive the MPS model [2] . The generation of the aggregated phase model consists of the following steps:
• Identifying Phases. The phase changes are identified in the topology models and in the user workflows. The two sets of phase changes are merged, and the time intervals between the phase changes are identified as phases. In each phase the topology and the user demands (activities) remain static.
• Identifying Configurations. The configuration of each phase is assembled separately based on the applicationservice dependency models, the user activities and the network connections. A configuration is an object model, a snapshot, encompassing all the participating users (nodes) and wireless connections. Wireless connections are also modeled as UML objects with special dependability parameters as described in Section 3.1.3.
The Multiple Phased System Model
According to our evaluation approach (Section 2) the analysis model is a MPS model. The Phase Net (PhN) represents the phases in time using immediate and timed transitions with deterministic timing. The System Net (SN) defines the dependability related behavior of the system being analyzed. The SN has immediate and timed transitions with exponential distribution. The transitions may also have guard expressions that may refer to the marking of the PhN, this way establishing the connection between the SN and the PhN.
The Phase Net.
The phase net model consists of a series of places, each place representing a phase. Deterministic timed transitions are included between the consecutive places, each having a delay equivalent to the length of the phase modeled by the input place.
The System Net.
The system net is constructed by an automatic model transformation based on the UML object models capturing the configurations of phases. Here a modular dependability model construction approach is followed [12] . Namely, the UML based model of the system architecture allows a modular composition of the dependability model: component and interconnection types (identified by stereotypes) are associated with GSPN analysis subnets that represent their generic fault occurrence, error propagation and repair mechanisms. In case of a redundant structure, the non-trivial error propagation is modelled by another subnet. The subnets used in our evaluation workflow are illustrated below. The subnets assigned to the same component or interconnection type share the same structure but can be parameterized using the characteristics (represented by UML tagged values) of the individual components and interconnections. The generic subnets together with the error propagation subnets belonging to commonly used redundancy techniques and repair mechanisms are placed into an analysis subnet library and can be re-used to compose the system net in a modular way. Note that refined subnets can be used if more information about the dependability properties of a component is available (e.g., internal operation of a redundancy manager is described by using UML statechart diagram), allowing this way a hierarchical refinement.
The subnets representing components have specific places called interface places that represent its status (called healthy, faulty and erroneous with the obvious meaning). Figure 4 illustrates the GSPN analysis subnet of a stateful hardware component. The rate of timed transitions are depicted in braces. The parameters of immediate transitions are weights that determine the probability of firing in case when multiple immediate transitions are enabled at the same time. The parameters refer to the values that have been provided in the UML model (see Section 3.1.3). In the initial state the component is in the healthy state (the place H is marked). The subnet models the fault occurrence and the error latency using exponential transitions fault (with fault occurrence rate FO) and latency (with rate 1/EL, where EL is the error latency), respectively. In case of hardware components, transient and permanent faults may occur (as represented by the transitions trans and perm, respectively). The parameter called PP determines the ratio of permanent faults. Permanent faults need explicit repair that is modelled by the transition explicit with the rate 1/RD, where RD is the repair delay.
Modeling Changes in the Configuration.
In the system net model there is a Petri net subnet modeling each object and UML link that is present in at least one phase of the scenario. However, the configuration of the objects and the network topology connecting them varies in time along the scenario, which has to be reflected by the Petri net model. The presence of objects and UML links are modeled with the proper guard expressions of the transitions referring to the phase net. If objects (such as stateful softwares, stateless hardwares, etc.) are part of the configuration in a scenario, they have to exhibit the regular failure-recovery behavior. However, if an object is not part of the configuration, its functionality depends on its nature. For example, the Petri net model of a stateful hardware is not influenced by whether it is part of the configuration, because hardware faults may occur at any time. On the other hand a stateful piece of software that is demand triggered (e.g., a user application) cannot fail if it is not part of the configuration, and every time it becomes part of the configuration it is initiated in the healthy state. Figure 5 shows the Petri net model of restartable software objects. In phases when the object is part of the configuration, the timed transitions (explicit, fault and latency) are enabled, and the immediate ones (stop1 and stop2) are disabled, this way it exhibits the normal failure-recovery behaviour. In phases when it is not part of the configuration, the timed transitions are disabled, and the immediate ones are enabled, this way ensuring that next time it is used, it is initiated in the healthy state. Figure 6 illustrates the GSPN subnet assigned to a common UML link modelling an "uses the service of" relation. This subnet represents an unidirectional error propagation between the related components. It is connected to the interface places of the subnets representing the source and target components. If the source subnet is in the faulty state then an error may be propagated to the target with the probability PP.
If a component is not part of the configuration in a given phase then it is "separated" by using proper guard expressions in the propagation subnets. In these cases the presence of the subnet corresponding to the UML link must not have any effect on the rest of the model. This is implemented with the guard expressions of the transitions restart and Modeling Changes in the Wireless Network Topology.
The static wireless network topology of a phase is modeled as a set of peer-to-peer connections. Figure 7 illustrates the UML object model of a peer-to-peer network connection. An object stereotyped wireless models a connection only in one direction, so a symmetrical connection is modeled with two wireless objects and the belonging UML links. The connection is established between WLAN network interfaces that are modeled as stateful hardwares (WLAN1 and WLAN2). The Petri net subnet modeling a connection (see Figure 8) represents the failure-recovery process of the wireless link. If the peer-to-peer link is alive, the transitions up, repair and fault are enabled. If the connection is not part of the given topology of a phase only the transition called down is enabled, the rest are disabled. This mechanism models the topology as it is potentially provided by the environment. Modeling the Users.
The users are identified by a specific stereotype in the application dependency models. The corresponding analysis subnets do not represent failure and repair processes but include the interface places connected by guarded propagation subnets (belonging to the "uses the service of" links) to the subnets representing the applications invoked by the user. The assigned reward expressions are defined in such a way that the reward is accumulated if all relevant applications are available. In the analysis step we use the DEEM solver to calculate the values of these reward expressions.
On the Implementation of the Model Transformations
First, the aggregated phase model is constructed that carries the information on the hardware, software and network configuration of the participants (mobile nodes) of the scenario evolving in time.
In the next step the MPS model of the scenario is constructed:
• The Phase Net is constructed from the aggregated phase model by a single transformation step. Each phase is represented by a place in the Phase Net. The places for two consecutive phases are connected with a deterministic timed transition. The time value is set to the length of the phase.
• To construct the System Net, we have adopted the dependability model construction tool presented in [11] . It is able to derive the GSPN dependability models automatically from enhanced UML models of the system architecture. The tool constructs an internal graph model representing components with typed nodes and interconnections with typed edges (the types are identified in the UML model). In the dependability model construction phase, the GSPN subnets corresponding to these nodes and edges are taken from the library of analysis subnets, and interconnected through the interface places.
Currently the Viatra2 [1] graph transformation framework is used to carry out the model transformation steps, and the DEEM model is generated fully automatically.
A technical challenge of the implementation has been the placement of the previously existing transformation [11] into a temporal context. The solution of the problem included the assembly of enabling functions of transitions based on the configurations of phases.
The transformation steps that altogether comprise the entire workflow are numerous but small, for example, the merging of phases defined in the user workflows and the topology in time, binding the representations of participants together (workflow, application dependency model and topology node). These steps can be grouped into two sets. One of them is suitable for an easy implementation as graph transformations. The other group of steps are more easily to be implemented as regular imperative programs. Due to the abilities of the Viatra2 framework a transformation can be extended with native function steps that are carried out in Java.
At this stage, the implementation is composed of 13 metamodels, 8 transformation steps and 27 native functions.
EXAMPLE
In this section we present an example scenario to discuss how the approach can be used for dependability evaluation. The scenario is seven minutes long, divided into two phases (three and four minutes long, respectively). In the first phase there are two participants having a chat conversation between each other, while in the second phase another participant enters the scenario, an ambulance that broadcasts a warning message.
As it has already been discussed, the inputs of the evaluation workflow are the application-service dependency models of the applications for each participant, the user workflows, and the topology model of the scenario. Figure 10 illustrates the application-service dependency model of one participant using the chat and ambulance warning applications. The top object, stereotyped SYS, represents the user. C1 models the chat application, AN1 stands for the ambulance warning application. Both are modeled as stateful software objects that can be started on user demand. Both of them uses the IP routing service (IPRS), which is a stateful object that runs as a daemon, i.e., it is not triggered on demand but offers a continuous service. The network interface of the car (WLAN1) is modeled as a stateful hardware object. These types are indicated by the UML stereotypes. The workflow of the user is depicted in Figure 3 . For the sake of simplicity let us suppose that the topology model is very simple. In the first phase the topology is only the connection between the two participants having a chat conversation. In the second phase the topology consist of three connections among the two participants and the ambulance. Figure 9 illustrates how the topology is modeled. Objects named WLAN1, WLAN2 and WLAN3 represent the network interfaces of the cars. Objects stereotyped as wireless represent the wireless connections.
According to Section 3.2.2 the existence of objects and links between them can be modeled in the System Net model using proper guard expressions of transitions. In the first phase the objects W2TW3, W3TW2, W1TW3, W3TW1 will be modeled as nonexistent (the ambulance is not communicating with the other two participants). As an example, the guard expressions belonging to the network connections between wireless network interfaces WLAN2 and WLAN3 are presented in Figure 11 . The transitions are enabled if the guard expression is empty, or its value is true. In case of false the transition is disabled. The guards of the rest of the transitions can be composed in a similar way.
The MPS model belonging to this scenario consists of 172 places and 195 transitions. The automated model transfor- down : mark (PH1)=1 r e p a i r : mark (PH2)=1 f a u l t : mark (PH2)=1 up : mark (PH2)=1 Figure 11 : The guard expressions belonging to the subnet modeling the network link W2TW3 mation took 11,4 seconds. The DEEM Simulator [14] was used to evaluate the reward functions which model the probabilities of the successful execution of the scenario. The results were calculated in 53 seconds with a confidence interval of 0.2% and confidence level of 95%.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced a dependability modelling and evaluation approach that combines hierarchical modelling and time-based decomposition to deal with application complexity, network dynamicity and users mobility. The systemlevel dependability model is constructed in the form of a MPS model by an automatic process (evaluation workflow) that includes several model transformation steps. The solution of the dependability model provides user level dependability measures like the probability of successful execution of the user activities. The correctness of the model transformations has been verified systematically starting from simple scenarios and comparing the obtained final results with those obtained from the solution of the corresponding MPS model built and checked manually (not using the automatic derivations). The evaluation workflow follows the principle of holistic multi-level modeling as it can integrate the results of individual evaluation techniques developed at application, architecture or network level.
Our short term plan is to extend the present modeling methodology to support a more realistic representation of multi-hop communications with abstract objects capturing the availability of routes. In the long run we plan to exercise the modeling framework for the analysis of use-cases of interest like those identified in the HIDENETS [9] context, also to explore the framework's scalability not only with respect to computation but also with respect to readability and maintainability. Another research direction is to integrate decomposition approaches in the derivation process in order to further cope with the complexity that may hinder the analytical evaluation. We aim to identify the (groups of) users who perform independent activities in the scenario. The evaluation of the dependability of the mobile distributed environment for these groups can be carried out in isolation.
